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OHIO
Gregory W. Watts & Matthew W. Onest†

I. MINERAL OWNERSHIP
A. The Ohio Marketable Title Act
Ohio courts continue applying the Ohio Marketable Title Act to
severed oil and gas rights.1 As with many statutes, there are generally
two questions that must be answered: (1) does the particular statute
apply to the particular facts of the case and (2) if the statute applies in
the first instance, how does a court apply the statute to the particular
facts of the case? Both questions about Ohio’s Marketable Title Act
and severed mineral interests were further examined and explored in
2020.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I3.9
†

Attorneys at the law firm of Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A
1. Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, 148 N.E.3d 34, 39–41 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019),
modified on reconsideration, No. 18 BE 0051, 2019 WL 7670234 (Ohio Ct. App.
2019), appeal granted, 145 N.E.3d 311 (Ohio 2020).
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1. Does the Ohio Marketable Title Act apply to severed minerals,
generally?
In West v. Bode, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted a discretionary
appeal on the specific issue of whether the Ohio Marketable Title Act
applies to severed mineral rights or whether the enactment of the Ohio
Dormant Mineral Act (R.C. 5301.56) precluded its application.2 On
December 3, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court finally answered this
question in the affirmative.3
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio Marketable Title still
applies to severed mineral interests.4 The Court determined that (1)
there was not an “irreconcilable conflict between the Dormant Mineral
Act and the Marketable Title Act”5, (2) that the Ohio General
Assembly intended for both statutes to apply to severed mineral
interests6, and (3) the statutes provide “independent, alternative
statutory mechanisms that may be used to reunite severed mineral
interests with the surface property subject to those interests.”7
As to the claim there was a conflict between the statutes because the
statutes have different mechanisms, the Court saw no problem with
applying both statutes independent of one another: “[b]ut the fact that
the two acts operate differently, toward different ends, does not mean
that they are irreconcilably in conflict. Indeed, it suggests the
contrary.”8
Based on the West decision, surface owners may use both statutes,
“either of which may be used to effect the termination of a severed
mineral interest, depending on the circumstances of the case and the
time that has elapsed.”9
On December 29, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court denied the mineral
owners’ motion for reconsideration in West, thereby solidifying its
present precedential value.10
The Fifth and Seventh District Court of Appeals had, on several
occasions, confronted the question posed in West. From 2019 to 2020,
like in previous years, these courts continued to hold that the
Marketable Title Act does indeed apply to severed minerals, in
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

West v. Bode, 137 N.E.3d 1190, 1196 (Ohio 2019).
West v. Bode, No. 2019-1494, 2020 WL 7049820, ¶ 11(Ohio 2020).
Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
Id. ¶¶ 2, 27-42.
Id.
Id. ¶ 59.
Id. ¶ 29.
Id. ¶ 44.
West v. Bode, 159 N.E.3d 1168 (Ohio 2019).
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conjunction with and parallel to the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act.11
Ohioans and legal practitioners now have the Ohio Supreme Court’s
say on this matter.
2. How does the Ohio Marketable Title Act apply to the particular
severed mineral at issue in each case?
Moving past the threshold question of whether to apply the
Marketable Title Act to severed mineral interests, Ohio courts
continue to examine and refine how the particular provisions of the
statute apply to certain mineral interests or certain fact patterns.
In Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, the Seventh District Court of Appeals
held that: (1) a surface owner was not precluded from using the
Marketable Title Act to extinguish a mineral interest after the surface
owner attempted an abandonment under the Dormant Mineral Act and
(2) actions by the surface owner or mineral interest holder under the
Dormant Mineral Act would not revive an interest already
extinguished by the Marketable Title Act.
The case raised three important issues. First, the court held the
Marketable Title Act applies to severed mineral rights.12 Second, the
court held that a landowner is permitted to use the Marketable Title
Act to extinguish mineral interests when the landowner had already
attempted to use the Dormant Mineral Act to abandon the same
interest allowed, noting that a landowner can raise alternative theories
of recovery in a case.13 Further, under Ohio Revised Code section
5301.51, if a mineral interest has already been extinguished under the
Marketable Title Act, it cannot be revived. Therefore, it is unclear how
an action by the surface owner (whether under the Dormant Mineral
Act or not) could somehow revive an already extinguished interest.
Third, how do you determine the forty-year look back period under
the MTA? Ohio Revised Code section 5301.48 indicates that a person
has record marketable title if he or she has an unbroken chain of title
11. See Peppertree Farms, L.L.C., v. Thonen, No. 2019CA00159, 2020 WL
2563411, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 2020); Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen,
No. 2019CA00161, 2020 WL 2563417, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 2020);
Erickson, 151 N.E.3d at 116; Cain v. Horn, No. 19CA000031, 2020 WL 2989117,
at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 2020), appeal granted, 151 N.E.3d 634 (Ohio 2020);
Miller v. Mellott, 130 N.E.3d 1021, 1026 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019), appeal granted, 138
N.E.3d 1163 (Ohio 2020).
12. Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, 148 N.E.3d 34, 39–41 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019),
modified on reconsideration, No. 18 BE 0051, 2019 WL 7670234 (Ohio Ct. App.
2019), appeal granted, 145 N.E.3d 311 (Ohio 2020).
13. Id. at 40.
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for forty years or more with nothing in the record purporting to divest
the person of the interest. Record marketable title extinguished
interests and claims existing prior to the effective date of the root of
title.14 “Root of title” is defined as:
[t]hat conveyance or other title transaction in the chain
of title of a person, purporting to create the interest
claimed by the person, upon which he relies as a basis
for the marketability of his title, and which was the
most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior
to the time when marketability is being determined.15
The court found that a root of title has two elements; one is temporal,
and one is substantive.16 The root of title cannot be the initial
severance deed of the interest the person is seeking to extinguish, but
it can contain a repetition of a reservation. To determine the root of
title, one must find a deed at least forty years prior to the time
marketability is being determined and then examine the recordings in
the forty years succeeding that title transaction to see if there is
anything in the record purporting to divest the person of the claimed
interest.17 If there is, then that deed does not qualify as the root of title,
and the next preceding deed must be examined. A title examiner
continues moving back in time until he or she finds a conveyance
followed by forty years of clean title. That document is the root, and
the examiner can safely conclude that the act extinguished all
competing interests recorded prior to that date.
Once the examiner finds a forty-year period where there is no
preserving act, it is important to understand that no act occurring after
the forty-year period can revive the extinguished interest. Therefore,
while there were leases executed by the mineral holders in 2016 and
2017, those leases would not revive the interest if it was already
extinguished. The court found that there were no preservation acts
within the applicable forty-year periods (1954–1994 for one
reservation and 1971–2011 as to other reservations), and therefore
they were extinguished.18

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.47(A) (West 2018).
Id. § 53047(E).
Senterra, 148 N.E.3d at 42.7
Id. at 42–43.
See id. at 48–49.
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In Richmond Mills, Inc. v. Ferraro, the Seventh District Court of
Appeals, in addition to deciding that the Marketable Title Act applies
to severed mineral interests, interpreted Ohio Revised Code section
5301.51(B). That portion of the Ohio Revised Code provides a method
for preserving any possessory interest under the MTA:
If the same record owner of any possessory interest in
land has been in possession of the land continuously
for a period of forty years or more, during which period
no title transaction with respect to such interest appears
of record in his chain of title, and no notice has been
filed by him on his behalf as provided in division (A)
of this section, and such possession continues to the
time when marketability is being determined, the
period of possession is equivalent to the filing of the
notice immediately preceding the termination of the
forty-year period described in division (A) of this
section.19
The physical possession, preserving event under the Marketable Title
Act applies to all possessory interests affecting real property, not just
severed oil and gas rights. The Seventh District interpreted this statute
in a more expansive manner by holding there is no need for the
possessory interest owner to physically possess the land. Instead, the
court opted for a definition of possession that only requires the owner
to still be alive when marketability is determined.20 Under such an
interpretation, all record owners of a pre-root interest would be
presumed to be in constructive possession merely by being a record
owner.
B. The Ohio Dormant Mineral Act
1. How extensive of a search for mineral holders must a surface
owner undertake before publishing notice of intent to abandon
severed minerals?
In Gerrity v. Chervenak,21 the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the
reach of the notice requirements the Dormant Mineral Act imposes as
19. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.51(B) (West 2018).
20. Richmond Mills, Inc. v. Ferraro, No. 18 JE 0015, 2019 WL 6974458, *8
(Ohio Ct. App. 2019), appeal granted, 148 N.E.3d 595 (Ohio 2020).
21. No. 2019-1123 (Ohio 2020).
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prerequisites to deeming a severed mineral interest abandoned and
vested in the owner of the surface of the land subject to the severed
mineral interest.
In Gerrity, the minerals to Guernsey County property were severed
in a 1961 deed.22 A title search revealed the mineral rights were
conveyed to Jane F. Richards by a certificate of transfer filed with the
Guernsey County Recorder in 1965.23 The certificate of transfer lists
a Cleveland, Ohio address for Richards.24 “The Chervenak chain of
title contained no other records regarding ownership of the severed
mineral interest.”25
Before a severed mineral interest becomes vested in the owner of
the surface, the Dormant Mineral Act provides the surface owner shall
“[s]erve notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each
holder or each holder’s successors or assignees, at the last known
address of each, of the owner’s intent to declare the mineral interest
abandoned.26 If service of notice cannot be completed to any holder,
the owner shall publish notice of the owner’s intent to declare the
mineral interest abandoned[.]”27
The Dormant Mineral Act broadly defines holder to include the
record holder, and any person who derives the person’s rights from the
record holder.28 The Supreme Court found that a surface owner does
not need to specifically identify by name every holder, because when
the identity of a holder cannot be identified, publication is expressly
permitted when service cannot be completed by certified mail – which
is plainly the case when a holder cannot be identified.29
The Supreme Court noted the Dormant Mineral Act was enacted to
“address the difficulty (and sometimes impossibility) of identifying
the owners of severed mineral interests and to encourage reliance on
record chains of title.”30 Requiring endless searching is not the
intended consequence of the statute because “[n]o matter the effort
expended, a surface owner can never be certain that he has identified
every successor and assignee of every holder who appears in the public

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56(E) (West 2021)
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56(A)(1) (West 2021).
Gerrity, No. 2019-1123, ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 20.
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record.”31 Indeed, the Supreme Court held that the legislature did not
intend service by certified mail to be mandatory, nor does it mandate
an attempt at service by certified mail “when it is apparent that such
service cannot be completed.”32
The Supreme Court rejected Gerrity’s attempt to incorporate the
service requirements under Civil Rule 4.4, which requires an affidavit
of all efforts to locate a party to be served with notice of a lawsuit
before service by publication can be granted by a court order.33
The Supreme Court also rejected Gerrity’s argument that a
reasonable search should include the internet:
The ever-changing quantum and quality of information
available on the Internet, the inconsistent reliability of
that information, and the variability of Internet-search
results all weigh against a bright-line requirement for
online searches, let alone a bright-line requirement that
a surface owner consult any particular paid
subscription services, to identify heirs to a severed
mineral interest.34
Whether a party has exercised reasonable diligence will depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case.35 Thus, no bright line test
exists. However, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the test. A
surface owner must start by searching the chain of title to the property
at interest as a starting point.36 “In addition to property records in the
county in which the land that is subject to the mineral interest is
located, a reasonable search for holders of a severed mineral interest
will generally also include a search of court records, including probate
records, in that county.”37 Whether any further searching will be
necessary will depend on the results of the county search or the surface
owner’s independent knowledge.38 Assuming those searches do not
reveal any additional information (including that the holder has died,
31. Id. ¶ 21.
32. Id. ¶ 24.
33. Id. ¶ 27 (“The General Assembly has not incorporated the requirements of
Civ.R. 4.4 or R.C. 2703.24—or any similar requirements—into the Dormant
Mineral Act as prerequisites for using notice by publication, and this court may not
do so by judicial fiat.”).
34. Id. ¶ 34.
35. Id. ¶ 31.
36. Id. ¶ 35.
37. Id.
38. Id. ¶ 36.
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transferred the interest, or has a more recent address), it appears no
further search is necessary, and the surface owner can proceed to send
notice, including by publication (which the Court held raises no dueprocess concerns).
In Fonzi v. Brown, the Seventh District Court of Appeals examined
what level of research is needed, specifically looking at whether a
surface owner must look at counties outside where the real property at
issue is located. The court stated, “[w]e again decline to establish a
bright-line rule requiring a specific search process and reaffirm that
what constitutes reasonable due diligence will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case.”39 Thus, Fonzi does not require any
specific type of search. Instead, the decision reinforces the need to
look at each case on its unique facts.
Additionally, in Fonzi, the title researcher had specific knowledge
the reserving party lived in Washington County, Pennsylvania, as the
“reservation deed expressly stated that this is where the Fonzis
lived.”40 The title researcher “conceded that he learned this fact early
in his search process.”41 It was “[t]his fact alone that would have led
any reasonable researcher to extend the search into Washington
County, Pennsylvania.”42 Therefore, the Seventh District held that the
surface owner “had specific knowledge” that the mineral owners or
their families lived in a different county and state than the subject
property.43 The surface owner’s “failure to conduct any search into the
Washington County public records after learning that this is where the
Fonzis resided” was “per se unreasonable based on the facts of this
case.”44 The outcome in Fonzi, that the search was unreasonable,
turned on one fact—the surface owner had actual knowledge of where
the reserving parties lived and did not check there.
In Hutchins v. Baker, the Seventh District Court of Appeals decided
whether an affidavit of fact relating to how a holder allegedly acquired
her interest in the minerals was a title transaction, meaning a
preserving event under the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act.45 The affidavit
at issue discussed three alleged title transactions from which the holder
39. Fonzi v. Brown, No.19 MO 0012, 2020 WL 3639886, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 1, 2020).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at *6.
44. Id.
45. Hutchins v. Baker, No. 19 MO 0005, 2020 WL 1488726, at *3–*4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 26, 2020). )
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claimed her title to the minerals.46 It also described “each death and
passing of the interest was a title transaction regarding the mineral
interest.”47 The affidavit described “family history and heirship” but
did not actually claim to convey the interest from one party to another
party (the appellant).48
The term “title transaction” is not defined within Ohio Revised
Code section 5301.56; however, it has been interpreted to have the
same meaning as defined in the Ohio Marketable Title Act.49 A title
transaction is “any transaction affecting title to any interest in land,
including title by will or descent, title by tax deed, or by trustee’s,
assignee’s, guardian’s, executor’s, administrator’s, or sheriff’s deed,
or decree of any court, as well as warranty deed, quit claim deed, or
mortgage.”50
Although the affidavit at issue in Hutchins described “how title was
received,” it was “not a transaction.”51 And descriptions “of prior title
transactions” are not, in and of themselves, title transactions.52 The
Hutchins court held the affidavit was not a title transaction and then
separately analyzed whether it qualified as a “claim to preserve,” as
the term is used in the Dormant Mineral Act.53 The court ultimately
decided it was not a valid claim to preserve because it did not contain:
(1) the mineral holder’s address; (2) the names of the record owner of
the lands covered by the affidavit (meaning the surface owners); (3)
the recording information for the surface owners’ acquisition
instruments; and (4) the recording information for the instrument from
where the property description came.54 The court held this affidavit
neither strictly nor substantially complied with the statute’s
requirements, which somewhat contradicts a previous decision from
the same court.55 Thus, it appears the court failed to set any bright-line
test on what is sufficient to be a claim to preserve.

46. Id. at *3.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Dodd v. Croskey, 37 N.E.3d 147, 154 (Ohio 2015).3
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.47(F) (West 2018).
51. Hutchins, 2020 WL 1488726 at *4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *4.
55. Compare id. with Paul v. Hannon, No. 15 CA 0908, 2017 WL 1231743 at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017)..

2021]

OHIO

409

C. Words of Inheritance and Life Estates
Real property estates conveyed or reserved prior to March 25, 1925,
needed to have words of inheritance, such as “to [grantor], heirs, and
assigns forever,” otherwise it conveyed or reserved merely a life
estate.56 On March 25, 1925, Ohio General Code section 8510-1 went
into effect, which removed the requirement of words of inheritance.
In Headley v. Ackerman, the Seventh District Court of Appeals
Court held no words of inheritance were required to extend a royalty
reservation past a life estate if the interest in the conveyance or
reservation was already in existence.57 Essentially, if the reserving
party intended to reserve and at the same time create a new property
interest, meaning one unique to that which was previous owned, then
words of inheritance were needed. Otherwise, no such words were
needed.
In Peppertree Farms, LLC v. Thonen, the Fifth District Court of
Appeals held that the following pre-1925 mineral reservations had to
have words of inheritance or they were merely life estates: “is hereby
reserved and is not made part of this transfer” and “excepts and
reserves one-half of the royalty of the oil and gas under the described
real estate.”58 The court relied on the fact that each of these
reservations indicated “the grantors were reserving interests unto
themselves, not merely excepting them from the grant.”59 Thus,
whether to apply the rule to a particular mineral reservation will be
fact-sensitive, focusing upon the original parties’ intent.
II. MINERAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
A. Oil and Gas Lease Issues
1. Lease Royalty Issues
As the development of Ohio’s shale moved away from leasing and
mineral acquisition and into production of the minerals, there have
been significantly more lawsuits about the calculation of landowners’
56. Roberts v. Jones, 91 N.E.2d 817, 818 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); see also Gill v.
Fletcher, 78 N.E. 433 (Ohio 1906); Embleton v. McMechen, 143 N.E. 177 (Ohio
1924).
57. Headley v. Ackerman, No. 16 MO 0010, 2017 WL 4351411 at *6 (Sept. 22,
2017).
58. Peppertree Farms, L.L.C., v. Thonen, No. 2019CA00159, 2020 WL
2563411, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 2020).
59. Id.
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lease royalties. Landowners throughout Ohio have brought claims
alleging the producers wrongfully calculated their royalties under the
operative oil and gas leases.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
operating with diversity jurisdiction, decided two cases involving the
same oil and gas lease (meaning the royalty provisions were identical
in the cases). In Bounty Minerals, LLC v. Chesapeake Exploration,
LLC and Zehentbauer Family Land LP v. Chesapeake Exploration,
LLC, the court decided whether the producer was permitted to assess
post-production costs against the landowner’s gas royalty under the
following royalty provision:
To pay to the Lessor seventeen and one-half percent []
royalty based upon the gross proceeds paid to Lessee
for the gas marketed and used off the leased premises,
including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance,
and produced from each well drilled thereon, computed
at the wellhead from the sale of such gas substances so
sold by Lessee in an arm’s-length transaction to an
unaffiliated bona fide purchaser, or if the sale is to an
affiliate of Lessee, the price upon which royalties are
based shall be comparable to that which could be
obtained in an arm’s-length transaction (given the
quantity and quality of the gas available for sale from
the leased premises and for a similar contract term) and
without any deductions or expenses except for Lessee
to deduct from Lessor’s royalty payments Lessor’s
prorated share of any tax, severance or otherwise,
imposed by any government body. For purposes of this
Lease, “gross proceeds” means the total consideration
paid for oil, gas, associated hydrocarbons, and
marketable by-products produced from the leased
premises.60

60. Bounty Minerals, LLC v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 5:17cv1695, 2019
WL 7171353, at *9–10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2019); see also Zehentbauer Family
Land, LP v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 934 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting that the
oil and gas leases in these cases contained different gas royalty percentages, but
contained identical language as to how to calculate the royalties, meaning with or
without post-production cost deductions).
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In Bounty, the district court determined that post-production costs
could be assessed against the landowner’s royalties, relying on the
single phrase “computed at the wellhead.”61 Initially, the district court
held that the phrase “computed at the wellhead” applied to both sales
to unaffiliated third parties and sales to affiliates.62 Then, the district
court went on to say that the point of valuation for gas royalties under
this lease form was “at the wellhead,” meaning the lease prohibits only
deductions for production costs.63 And Bounty ultimately lost its
claims against Chesapeake in this case because: (1) Bounty did not
dispute that the affiliate transaction between Chesapeake Exploration
and Chesapeake Marketing was an actual sale and (2) the district court
found Bounty’s royalties were calculated based on that transaction,
meaning calculated at the wellhead.64
In Zehentbauer Family Land, the district court followed the Bounty
court’s ruling. Zehentbauer was a class action, wherein the class
included all those lessors with the lease in Bounty and who had been
receiving royalties or were entitled to receive royalties.65 The district
court agreed with the Bounty court’s determination that the lessors’
royalties should be computed at the wellhead, meaning postproduction costs were permitted between the wellhead and the point
of actual sale upon which the initial sales price was taken.66 In doing
so, the district court essentially held that the gross proceeds language
prevented only those post-production costs incurred prior to the
61. Bounty Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 7171353 at *10–12.
62. Id. at *28 (quoting that “Indeed, as counsel for Bounty Minerals repeatedly
explained during oral argument, it is Bounty Minerals’ position that this Court
should entirely ignore the second clause of the gas royalty provision when applying
the third clause, rendering the “at the wellhead” language irrelevant. It is wellestablished, however, that a contract should be construed to give effect to all of its
provisions”).
63. Id. at *29.
64. Id. at 33 (quoting that “Notably, Bounty Minerals does not dispute that (1)
Chesapeake Exploration’s transfer of the hydrocarbons to CEM constitutes a ‘sale
to an affiliate’ under the Lease; or (2) Defendants calculated the value of the
hydrocarbons ‘at the wellhead.’ Therefore, the Court finds that Bounty Minerals has
failed to demonstrate that Defendants breached the gas royalty provisions of the
relevant leases)”.
65. Zehentbauer Family Land LP v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, 450 F. Supp. 3d
790, 811 (N.D. Ohio), appeal filed, No. 20-3469 (6th Cir. May 1, 2020).
66. Id. at 809 (“The Court finds the Lease language in the case at bar, ‘without
any deductions or expenses’ means CELLC and TEPUSA may not deduct the postproduction costs they pay prior to the sale to CEMLLC or TGPNA. Thus, CELLC
and TEPUSA follow the ‘without any deductions or expenses’ Lease language by
taking no deductions for their post-production costs from the price they receive from
the affiliate sales to CEMLLC or TGPNA.”).
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wellhead, thus adopting the netback method for calculating royalties.67
That Chesapeake Exploration was transacting with its marketing
affiliate did not change the district court’s analysis on this subject.68
In Gateway Royalty, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Exploration, Ohio state
courts Carroll County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals
decided whether Chesapeake could deduct post-production costs
under the following royalty provision:
as royalty for the gas marketed and used off the
premises and produced from each well drilled thereon,
the sum of one-eighth [] of such gas so marketed and
used at the price paid to [the] [l]essee . . . less any
charges for transportation, compression and/or
dehydration to deliver the gas for sale.69
The appellate court concluded that post-production deductions were
permitted because: (1) Chesapeake produced and marketed the gas
through production efforts; (2) Chesapeake sold the production to its
marketing affiliate “at or near the wellhead”; (3) the Chesapeake
marketing affiliate then calculated the netback “price by taking the
proceeds it receive[d] from third-party buyers downstream and
deducting the transportation, compression, gathering, and other
post-production costs it incurs”; and (4) the marketing company then
“pa[id] the Chesapeake defendants the ‘netback’ price for the gas and
NGLs produced and sold at the wellhead.”70
An interesting event occurred in proximity to the above-discussed
royalty cases—Chesapeake Energy Corporation and numerous
affiliated companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protections on
June 29, 2020.71
67. Id.
68. Id. at 810 (“The objective standard set forth in the plain language of the Gross
Royalty Leases is that the price on which royalties are based shall be comparable to
that which could be obtained in an arms length sale. Therefore, if CEMLLC pays
CELLC or TGPNA pays TEPUSA a price that is greater than what could be obtained
in an arms length sale, CELLC/TEPUSA may pay a royalty based on the lower price
a non-affiliated buyer would pay for the same gas.”).
69. Gateway Royalty, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Expl., No. 19 CA 0933, 2020 WL
1671626, at ¶ 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2020), reh’g denied sub nom. Gateway
Royalty, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 2020 WL 3604278 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 24, 2020).
70. Id. at *4.
71. Matthew DiLallo, Chesapeake Energy Files for Bankruptcy, THE MOTLEY
FOOL
(June
29,
2020,
8:58
AM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/06/29/chesapeake-energy-files-for-
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In Board of Education Toronto City Schools v. American Energy
Utica, LLC, an Ohio appellate court decided whether the lessor could
include American Energy Utica (the ultimately lessee and producer)
as a known principal when the oil and gas leasing documents listed
only American Energy Utica’s agent.72 The court held that the lessor
could do just that because American Energy had authorized the agent
to enter into the contract.73
2. Statute of Limitations on Lease Expiration Claims
In Browne v. Artex Oil Co., the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
cause of action alleging an oil and gas lease expired or terminated by
its own terms must be brought within twenty-one years of when the
cause of action accrues, which is the statute of limitations for quiet
title actions in Ohio.74 In doing so, the Court rejected the argument
that lease termination or expiration claims are based on breaches of
contract.75 The court declined to answer when the cause of action
actually accrues, leaving that to future cases.76
3. Paying Quantities Under Oil and Gas Leases
Several Ohio cases have examined whether oil and gas leases
continue to be held by production in paying quantities. In Talbott v.
Condevco, Inc., the Ohio appellate court made several holdings
relating to lease expiration: (1) unless an oil and gas lease requires the
lessee to comply with state reporting requirements, such as change of
ownership forms for oil and gas wells, in order to perpetuate the lease,
then the lessee’s failure to comply does not terminate the lease;77 (2)
a lessee need not account for the fair market rental value of a swab rig
if the lessee owns their own swab rig and no charges are assessed to
bankruptcy.aspx [https://perma.cc/CZ4Z-XYJX].
72. Bd. of Educ. Toronto City Sch. v. Am. Energy Utica, LLC, 152 N.E.3d 378
(Ohio Ct. App.), appeal denied sub nom. Toronto City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Am.
Energy Utica, L.L.C., 146 N.E.3d 586 (Ohio 2020).
73. Id. at 390.
74. Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 144 N.E.3d 378, 389 (Ohio 2019) (“We agree with
the Fourth District’s holding in Rudolph that an action to recognize the reversion of
mineral interests following the alleged termination of an oil and gas lease pursuant
to its express terms is not an action upon a written contract; it is more akin to a quiettitle action.”).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 390.
77. Talbott v. Condevco, Inc., No. 19 MO 0007, 2020 WL 2781729, at *7 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 4, 2020).5
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the lessee for the swab rig’s use;78 (3) the hours and wages for the
lessee’s employees who are paid to conduct the swabbing should be
counted as an operating expense, meaning the payment counts as an
expense in determining paying quantities profit;79 and (4) the
employees’ labor rate need not be set at the fair market labor rate for
workers outside the lessee for purposes of paying quantities analysis.80
In Tewanger v. Stonebridge Operating Co., the appellate court: (1)
assumed a paying-quantities claim accrual date of when production
under the lease began (which is somewhat confusing considering lease
termination cannot, by their nature, accrue until the production
ceases);81 and (2) held that the lease terminated because the lessee
conceded a lack of production for six consecutive years.82
In Fiocca v. AIM Energy, LLC, the appellate court held that a lessee
may pool common meter or common tank production from multiple
wells located on the same leasehold or leaseholds.83 In Fiocca, the
lessee drilled four wells on the same leasehold and pooled their
production volumes.84 The production from those wells was not
commingled with production from other wells located on other
leaseholds, thus there were no concerns about lack of production on
the leasehold at issue.85 The lease at issue did not require that each
well drilled under the lease separately produce in paying quantities,
thus there was no issue with commingling the wells’ production.
In Head v. Victor McKenzie Drilling, Inc., the appellate court
affirmed its prior precedent, holding that Ohio courts have no
authority to order an oil and gas well be plugged.86 Only the Chief of
the Ohio Department of Natural Resources has the authority to order
wells be plugged.87

78. Id. at *13.
79. Id. at *14.
80. Id.
81. Tewanger v. Stonebridge Operating Co., LLC, No. 17 NO 0456, 2020 WL
416290, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2020).
82. Id. at *10.
83. Fiocca v. AIM Energy, LLC, No. 19 CA 0930, 2019 WL 6713251, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2019).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Head v. Victor McKenzie Drilling, Inc., No. 19-CA-00002, 2019 WL
6118294, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2019).
87. Id.
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4. Implied Covenants
Pavsek v. Wade dealt with the implied covenant of reasonable
development and issues of notice to the lessee.88 When “a well is
producing in paying quantities under the lease, in order for a lessor to
assert that the failure to drill additional wells resulted in forfeiture for
breach of the implied covenant of reasonable development, the lessor
must have provided notice demanding further development to avoid
forfeiture.”89 The notice is designed to provide, and must contain, “a
reasonable time” for the lessee to conduct further development of the
leasehold.90 And the lessor is not excused from providing the notice
merely because a great deal of time has passed since the producing
well was originally drilled.91

88. Pavsek v. Wade, 136 N.E.3d 1283, 1286–87, 1290, 1293 (Ohio App. 7th
Dist. 2019).
89. Id. at 1293.
90. Id.
91. Id.

